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Abstract
The paper focuses on the recent pattern of government consumption expenditure in de-
veloping countries and estimates the determinants which have influenced government ex-
penditure. Using a panel data set for 111 developing countries from 1984 to 2004, this study
finds evidence that political and institutional variables as well as governance variables sig-
nificantly influence government expenditure. Among other results, the paper finds new evi-
dence of Wagner’s law which states that peoples’ demand for service and willingness to pay is
income-elastic hence the expansion of public economy is influenced by the greater economic
affluence of a nation (Cameron 1978). Corruption is found to be influential in explaining the
public expenditure of developing countries. On the contrary, size of the economy and frac-
tionalization are found to have significant negative association with government expenditure.
In addition, the study finds evidence that public expenditure significantly shrinks under mil-
itary dictatorship compared with other form of governance.
Keywords : Government expenditure; Corruption; Fractionalization; Governance; Political
institutions and Extreme bound analysis
JEL Classification: E01, E02, E61, E62, H2, H4, H5, H6, O11 and O5
1 Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War in 1945, governments have become more influential,
even in capitalist countries, as they provide social services and income supplements as well
as produce foods, manage the economy and invest in capital (Cameron 1978). In recent times,
external shocks and internal structural failures have had an unavoidable effect on economies.
Government intervention in such cases can play an important and effective role in adjusting
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adverse economic conditions. However, in choosing between monetary and fiscal policy, gov-
ernments prefer the latter to ensure a confirmed quick recovery from the ‘recessionary condi-
tion’ and to reestablish the confidence of the private sector (Kandil 2005, pg. 269). In developing
countries, in particular, fiscal policy has taken the lead in implementing and designing macroe-
conomic policies, while monetary policy has been subdued due to the need to stabilize a pegged
exchange rate, or to accommodate budget deficits.
Fiscal spending by governments, especially for developing economies, is crucial since such
expenditure provides channels for enhanced economic growth. Many notable studies such as
Elias (1985), Fan et al. (2000, 2004) and Fan and Rao (2003) have contributed to the establish-
ment of the positive linkage between government expenditure, production growth and poverty
reduction. While these studies were concerned with the role of government in economic devel-
opment, numerous studies have focused on the relationship between government expenditure
and economic growth. Authors such as Barro (1990), Devarajan et al. (1996) and Bose et al.
(2007) have found a positive relationship between government expenditure and growth.
Distinction, has been made between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ utilization and the
composition of public expenditure. It is generally agreed that larger government expenditure
on health, education and public infrastructures increases economic growth, which further im-
proves social welfare and effects a reduction in poverty. Such expenditure has a substantial
impact on the aggregate productivity of an economy as demonstrated in the seminal paper
by Aschauer (1989) in which he established a significant relationship between aggregate pro-
ductivity and the stock and flow of different government spending variables. He argued that
non-military public capital is more important for productivity and concluded that infrastructure
spending (such as on streets, highways, mass transit and sewerage) has the most significant as-
sociation with productivity. Aschauer’s conclusions were particularly important for developing
countries in which public expenditure symbolizes the ‘wheels’ – if not the engine – of economic
activity (WorldBank 1994).
Interestingly, no consistent trend can be seen in Figure 1, in which government expendi-
ture of developing countries over the last three decades has been plotted. By contrast, in the
case of developed countries like the United States, the share of GDP devoted to government
expenditure has demonstrated a steady and increasing trend since 1970 (Hyman 1993, pg. 14).
Hence, concerns could arise about the existing variations in government expenditure among
the developing countries. Given the financial constraints faced by these countries, it is impor-
tant to understand the factors and determinants that have influenced government expenditure
in developing countries. Only a handful of studies have dealt with these questions, since the
major difficulties of such research is the paucity of data and the issue of data reliability, which
may be an impediment to this type of research. There also exists no comprehensive theory
that can explain the large variations in government expenditure, and different studies are quite
independent and fragmented.
The aim of this study is to investigate the aforementioned research questions with the aid of
a panel dataset. The approach taken is to test a number of different hypotheses which have been
used and proposed in various literature. Using a panel dataset for the 111 developing countries
over the period 1984-2004, this study has estimated models to find the possible determinants
of government expenditures. In particular, this study examines the impact of the electoral pol-
itics of a nation (for example, the partisan composition and political structure of government),
the institutional structure and the current state of governance on government expenditure. To
facilitate this investigation, categorized variables have been used, namely: a) demographical
variables, b) fractionalization variables, c) political variables and, d) governance and institu-
tional variables. Statistical evidence confirms that all these sets of categorical variables have
significant power in explaining government expenditure in developing countries, which is a
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noteworthy contribution to the literature.
2 Background
FIGURE 1: Government consumption expenditure as % of GDP for developing countries (unbalanced
panel.)
To understand the total government expenditure pattern, it is useful to break down the total
government spending following the classification stated in Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008),
Government spending = Government consumption + Public investment +
Transfers + Debt services.
According to the System of National Accounting (SNA) 1993, Government Consumption is
termed as Government Final Consumption Expenditure (GFCE) which is the current expendi-
ture by general government bodies on services (for example, defence, education, public order,
road maintenance, wages and salaries, office space and government-owned vehicles) and net
outlays on goods and services for current use. Exception has been made in the case of defence
expenditure, which is purchase of durable military equipment (such as ships and aircraft used
as weapon platform) and outlays on construction works for military purposes. Consumption
of fixed capital1 and intermediate consumption of goods and services (e.g., maintenance and
repair of fixed assets used in production, purchases of office supplies and the services of con-
sultants) are included, whereas the value of goods and services sold by government to other
sectors are excluded from such accounting. Transfer payments (e.g., interest payments for gov-
ernment debt securities and social assistance benefits) and subsidies are not included in this
expenditure since the data is taken from the national income accounts. As described in the ABS
1According to the SNA, consumption of fixed capital represents the reduction in the value of fixed assets used in pro-
duction during the accounting period resulting from physical deterioration, normal obsolescence or normal accidental
damage.
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(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000, chapter 14 pg. 215, section 14.305), GFCE comprises the
following:
Compensation paid to employees of general government bodies (other than producing cap-
ital goods) plus,
Intermediate consumption of goods and services (e.g., purchases of office supplies and the
services of consultants) less,
The value of goods and services sold by government to other sectors plus,
Consumption of fixed capital plus,
The timing adjustments for overseas purchases of defence equipment.
Figure 1 shows the pattern of general government final consumption expenditure as a percent-
age of GDP for the 111 developing countries (using an unbalanced dataset) over the period
1994 to 2004. This figure illustrates the wild variability that exists with the pattern of GFCE as
a percentage of GDP ratios for the developing economies. In the figure, one can easily observe
that the ratios jump from 3% to more than 60% with barely any consistency or discernible trends
over the period. The pattern of variability remains the same even if we separate the figure based
on continents (figure 5 in the appendix) or even if we have year-wise average of government
expenditure among countries (figure 6 in the appendix).
FIGURE 2: Arithmetic mean of government consumption expenditure as % of GDP for developing and
OECD countries (unbalanced panel.)
To understand how the mean variation of government expenditures for developing coun-
tries is different from the OECD countries, we first plot the simple arithmetic mean of govern-
ment expenditures for both the groups of countries (as a percentage of GDP) over the years
1994 − 2004 in Figure 2. Also to support our evidence we have quartile distribution of these
two sets of countries in the appendix (figure 7). However, this simple mean could be mislead-
ing, since it does not account for the difference in number of countries as well as the differences
in the size of economies, size of the population and size of actual government expenditure for
different economies in each year. To accommodate these features, we constructed weighted
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arithmetic means for population weight,2 GDP weight,3 and expenditure weight.4 In addition,
the median of government expenditures has been constructed to account for the center loca-
tion of the expenditure variation over the years. It is interesting to observe that all the share
weighted means and arithmetic means of developing countries follow almost the same upward
trend. It is evident from the figure 3 that with the increasing share of population and GDP,
developing countries increased their government expenditure. However, the median does not
follow this trend at all. Quite oppositely, the median government expenditure over the years
has a little or no trend which may suggest that countries having a larger share in total gov-
ernment expenditure have not increased their share of spending any faster rates than countries
with a lower share.
FIGURE 3: Various weighted means of government consumption expenditure as % of GDP for developing
and OECD countries (unbalanced panel.)
Comparing the same set of mean and weighted means for the OECD countries for the com-
parable periods, we can see that there is hardly any trend in the weighted arithmetic means
of government expenditures over the years, although the arithmetic mean (figure 2) shows an
upward trend. In contrast to our findings on median government expenditure in developing
countries, the expenditure of OECD countries exhibit a slight upward trend which could be
due to fact that countries with higher government expenditure actually increased their public
expenditure share, over the years.
It is compelling to observe that, on different mean scales, the GFCE (as a percentage of GDP)
vary from around 17% to almost 20% for the OECD countries over the years 1994-2004. Using
the same measuring tools, such fluctuation is a little over 10% to close to 15% for the developing
2Populationi/
n∑
i=1
populationi
3GDPi/
n∑
i=1
GDPi
4GFCEi/
n∑
i=1
GFCEi
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countries, which shows that, on average, the government expenditure of developing countries
(as a percentage of GDP) is lower than OECD countries. These low figures simply reflect that, in
most developing countries pension system, vulnerable groups benefits, government support for
families and public health care is still extremely limited. However, what is puzzling is the cross
national yearly variance of government expenditure in developing countries which is much
sharper than that of OECD countries (figure 4).
FIGURE 4: Variance of government consumption expenditure as % of GDP for developing and OECD
countries (unbalanced panel.)
To understand the causes of variation of government expenditure in developing countries, it
is essential to identify the factors that determine government expenditure and the scale of their
impact. The use of panel data is an effective approach in this type of research and is a common
practice in the economic growth literature, where a significant amount of growth analysis has
been done with panel data estimations. However the paucity of the data and the correlation
between the explanatory variables may present significant challenges to the estimation process.
To the best of the author’s knowledge, only a handful of works exist in the literature. One
significant stream of literature looked at the response of governments to GDP variation over
business cycles effects. By and large the literature argues that there is a profound divergence
between how fiscal policy is conducted in developing countries when comparing that to indus-
trial countries. While fiscal policy in industrial countries is either acyclical or countercyclical,
interestingly, fiscal policy in developing countries is mostly procyclical (Ilzetzki and Vegh 2008;
Gavin and Perotti 1997; Talvi and Vegh 2005). The reason behind such finding is not surprising
since developing countries suffer from imperfections in international credit markets that pre-
vent these countries to borrow in bad times (Gavin and Perotti 1997; Riascos and Vegh 2004;
Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004). Moreover explanations through the lens of political econ-
omy would also suggest that good times would likely encourage fiscal prodigality which may
also increase the rent-seeking activities in developing countries, thus increase the fiscal expen-
diture (Tornell and Lane 1998, 1999; Talvi and Vegh 2005; Ilzetzki and Vegh 2008; Alesina et al.
2008).
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Another stream of literature focused on the factors that influence the government expendi-
ture. An early work by De Haan et al. (1996) was conducted based on a panel data of OECD
countries for 12 years. In their paper, the authors concluded that investment spending by gov-
ernments is severely influenced by political decisions, and myopic governments will reduce
government spending more than governments with a longer policy horizon. They also con-
cluded that private investments complement government investments spending. On the other
hand, Sturm (2001) investigated the determinants of public capital spending for less developed
countries using panel data. He found ‘Political-Institutional’ variables (such as ideology, politi-
cal cohesion, political stability and political business cycles) may not significantly influence gov-
ernment capital spending. Boix (2004) analyzed the public sector of the East Asian countries and
concluded that democracy, urbanization and demographic change lead to large public sector.
Shelton (2007) tested several leading hypotheses of government expenditure using data from
the Global Financial Statistics of the IMF and various other sources. He tested separate sectors
of government expenditure and different levels of government, and concluded that ‘preference
heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditure’ (Shel-
ton 2007, pg. 2230). Other notable work on the determinants of public expenditure has been
undertaken by Fan and Rao (2003), who found that the structural adjustment programs, much-
discussed by the IMF, have increased government spending but that not all sectors received
equal treatment. They provided evidence in their study of declining government spending for
agriculture, education and infrastructure in Africa. Government spending on agriculture and
health sectors in Asia, and education and infrastructure in Latin America, have also declined
due to such adjustment programs.
3 Literature Review
3.1 Income
One of the earliest and probably most frequently-mentioned determinants of public spending
is economic growth, which is famously known as Wagner’s ‘law’. Wagner’s ‘law of expand-
ing state activity’ (Wagner 1883, pp.1-8) has been elaborated on by many scholars of Public
Economics (Bird 1971; Musgrave 1969; Gupta 1968). This law argues that people’s demand
for a service and their willingness to pay is income-elastic, hence the expansion of the public
economy is influenced by the greater economic affluence of a nation (Cameron 1978). In other
words, the scope of government tends to improve with the greater level of income and it is
often implied that the income elasticity of demand for government is larger than unity (Flster
and Henrekson 2001).
Several scholars have rejected Wagner’s argument and found evidence against it (Bird 1971;
Musgrave 1969; Gupta 1968). Peacock and Wiseman (1967) even rejected the ‘historical deter-
minism’ argument of Wagner’s law. Wildavsky (1975), on the other hand, provided a reverse
argument which has been termed ‘counter-Wagner’ law by Cameron (1978). Wildavsky’s argu-
ment predicts a negative relationship between growth and government expenditure, indicating
greater expansion of public expenditure for low-growth countries. Cross-country studies, such
as those of Wagner and Weber (1977), Abizadeh and Gray (1985), Ram (1987), Easterly and Re-
belo (1994) and Shelton (2007) did not find one cohesive conclusion regarding Wagner’s Law.
Interestingly, all the aforementioned studies have examined the correlation of per capita income
and the size of government in pursuit of evidence in favor of Wagner’s Law. However, Hen-
rekson (1993) remarked that since most of the work in support of Wagner’s law has been done
in levels of income, it could be spurious if there exists a cointegrated relationship between gov-
ernment expenditure and income, as suggested in Granger and Newbold (2001). In our present
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study, we will arrange tests for Wagner’s law and its relationship with government expenditure
by using per capita income as a regressor for GFCE.
3.2 Trade Openness
Cameron (1978) was the most influential among those who sought to establish a robust relation-
ship between trade openness and government expenditure. Using the sample of 18 OECD coun-
tries, he found evidence that countries with greater trade openness experienced large increases
in public expenditure during the period 1960 to 1975. He argued that more open economies will
have higher rates of industrial concentration, leading to more unionized labor markets which,
through collective bargaining, will influence public spending on social protection and social
infrastructure. Improving on Cameron’s work, which was limited to 18 wealth rich countries,
Rodrik (1998) demonstrated a significant positive correlation between openness and govern-
ment size using a 100-plus country sample. Rodrik argued that Cameron’s explanation of col-
lective bargaining and labor unionization was somewhat unlikely to explain the relationship,
since labor organizations in developing countries are not well organized and are therefore less
influential. Rodrik explained the correlation between openness and government expenditure
as social insurance against external risk. More open economies are exposed to greater external
risk, such as exchange rate fluctuation, supply or demand variability in the world market. Gov-
ernments mitigate such exposure to risk through increasing ‘the share of domestic output they
consume’ (Rodrik 1998, pg. 1028). For a developed country, with proper administrative capac-
ity, such risk is mitigated through spending on social protection, while developing countries,
lacking the administrative capacity, mitigate such risk through simpler solutions such as public
employment, in-kind transfers or public work programs. Apart from these two major studies,
scholars like Schmidt (1983) and Saunders and Klau (1985) have also found a correlation be-
tween trade openness and the size of the public sector; hence a positive correlation between
openness and GFCE as a percentage of GDP has been hypothesized.
3.3 Aid
Foreign aid as an institution began in 1947, and by 1960 it extended across many developing
countries in Asia and Africa. Advocates of aid argue that aid helps developing countries to re-
lease binding revenue constraints, strengthen domestic institutions, pay better salaries to public
employees, assist with poverty-reducing spending, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of governance (Brautigam and Knack 2004). Conversely, it is argued that higher aid inflows
might promote rent-seeking behavior by domestic vested interests that demand tax exemptions
or seek to avoid paying taxes, which leads to a decline in revenue (Clements et al. 2004). Critics
also argue that aid can lead to increased public and private consumption rather than invest-
ment, contributing less to growth (Please 1967; Papanek 1973; Weisskopf 1972). In his classic
paper, Heller (1975) showed that aid increases investment and simultaneously reduces domestic
borrowing and taxes which eventually has an influence on public consumption. The magnitude
of such an influence over public consumption, however, depends on the type of aid, as grants
have a strong ‘pro-consumption’ bias whereas loans are more ‘pro-investment’. Expanding on
Heller, Khan and Hoshino (1992) concluded that aid generally increases government consump-
tion and the marginal propensity to consume out of foreign aid is less than one, which means
that some public investment is also financed from aid. Many researchers (Otim 1996; Ouattara
2006; Remmer 2004) have found considerable linkage between aid and the expansion of gov-
ernment spending. Recent initiatives have called for a shift in aid towards grant-giving, in the
belief that excessive lending has led to huge debt accumulation in many countries and has not
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contributed to them reaching their development objectives (Clements et al. 2004). A positive
relationship between aid and GFCE as a percentage of GDP has therefore been hypothesized.
3.4 Debt
Due to rising interest rates, price hikes to oil imports and unfavorable conditions for the export
of primary product, government revenues have been declining in many developing countries
since 1979. During that period, expanded investment programs have been financed with for-
eign debt for many countries. These fiscal deficits further raise the external public debt through
public borrowing. External borrowing usually encourages fiscal over-spending, which raises
government expenditure. Similarly, the public debt burden may directly impact government
expenditure because an increase in the burden of debt beyond a specific threshold level could
generate disincentives for the public sector and investment or productive and adjustment ef-
forts, which is known as the ‘debt-overhang’ hypothesis (Krugman 1988). In addition, over-
valuation of official exchange rates has encouraged capital flight-driven external borrowing for
these nations (Mahdavi 2004).5
The 1980s debt crisis forced highly indebted countries to reduce fiscal deficit and adjust ex-
penditure as access to the foreign capital market became very constrained. The International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) macroeconomic adjustment program compelled many indebted coun-
tries to reduce fiscal deficit as part of the condition for their debt restructuring and relief ini-
tiative. Efforts intended to reduce fiscal deficit have distribution issues between expending
reduction and revenues increments. In general, the spending side of the budget is likely to bear
a heavier toll as a result of the deficit lessening than the revenue side, as spending cuts are more
quickly applicable than generating higher revenue through taxation. Since interest payments
on the debt are relatively inflexible and constitute a significant component of the public expen-
diture, expenditure cuts may fall upon current income and on the consumption levels of the
population, which will have an adverse welfare impact. In the case of developing countries,
expenditures such as education and medical or social safety net programs that directly bene-
fit low-income groups in the population should be protected to reduce the social cost of these
adjustments (Cornia et al. 1987). Hicks and Kubisch (1984) and Hicks (1989) have found that
unlike capital spending, social and defense spending appear to be protected, whereas capital in-
tensive sectors such as infrastructure and the wages and salaries of public employees carry the
major burden of expenditure reduction. Mahdavi (2004), in contrast, found that the politically
sensitive category of wages and salaries of public employees might not be adversely affected
by the debt burden. Hence, the impact of debt on GFCE will be an interesting outcome in this
study.
3.5 Fractionalization
Many researchers have argued that cross-country difference in public policy, government ex-
penditures and other economic factors could be better explained by investigating the ethnic di-
versity among countries. The main rationale for this argument is that an economy with a more
ethnically fragmented population may find it difficult to agree on public expenditure and effec-
tive policies, which may lead to political instability. A polarized ethnic society weakens the cen-
tralized control of government (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), causes the deterioration of the check
and balance (Persson et al. 1997) and encourages rent-seeking behavior (Mauro 1995). Easterly
and Levine (1997) find a strong negative relationship between ethnic fragmentation and some
public goods (such as telecommunication, transportation, electricity grids and education) in
5See Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) for a discussion of the interaction between capital flight and external debt
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African countries. They conclude that, due to such high levels of ethnic division and conflict,
African countries have largely adopted ‘growth-retarding’ policies over the years which could
be a principal reason for Africa’s recent growth tragedy. As a result of Easterly and Levine’s
(2007) paper, ethnic fragmentation became a standard control for the analysis of cross-country
regressions. Alesina et al. (1999) showed that shares of spending on productive public goods
like education and transportation are inversely related to a city’s ethnic fragmentation. Using
U.S. data, they concluded that preference of public policy is correlated with ethnicity and ethnic
conflict is therefore an important determinant of public finance. It was suggested that ethnic po-
larization and interest groups politics would encourage ‘patronage’ spending and discourage
non-excludable public goods. However, the effect of ethnic polarization on total government
expenditure is ambiguous because of the reverse effect of the differences mentioned above in
the spending patterns of the government. In a follow-up paper, Alesina et al. (2000) further
demonstrated, using U.S. data, that greater ethnic fragmentation leads to higher public em-
ployment, since governments of an ethnically diverse economy tend to use public employment
as an ‘implicit subsidy’ (Alesina et al. 2000, pg. 220) to ethnical interest groups who would oth-
erwise receive transfer payments. Politicians are interested in such strategies to disguise their
redistributive policies, to avoid opposition of precise tax-transfer schemes.
Interestingly, all the research mentioned above has used indices based on ‘ethnolinguistic
fractionalization’ (ETF), which relies mainly on linguistic heterogeneity rather than racial or
skin color distinctions. Alesina et al. (2003), devised a new measure of ethnic fragmentation
based on a broader classification of groups. Their study took account of racial, language and re-
ligious characteristics within a country using different sources. The dataset provides measures
for many more countries than those of ETF. This new dataset has three different indices of eth-
nicity, language and religion for each country. The authors found that ethnicity, language and
religion lead to different results when they are entered to explain government quality, especially
the quality of institutions and policies. Following the recent trend in cross-country regressions,
therefore, we also look at the effect of ethnic, language and religious fractionalization on the
GFCE as a percentage of GDP by using the Alesina et al. (2003) dataset.
3.6 Size of the Economy
An inverse relationship between government size and country size could arise from economics
of scale in the provision of public goods (Shadbegian 1999, 1996; Owings and Borck 2000; Brad-
bury and Crain 2002; Remmer 2004). Recent studies on the literature of country formation
(Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Alesina and Perotti 1997) have suggested that country size and gov-
ernment size are interconnected. Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) provided an explanation for their
findings of negative relationship between country size and government consumption. They
argued that expenditure related to non-rival public expenditures such as roads, parks and gen-
eral administration, when shared over a large population, lowers the per capita costs for a given
level of provision. Moreover, a larger population leads to increased heterogeneity of preferences
over the provision of public goods which could lower the per capita expenditure on public out-
lays. The equation developed by Dao (1994) on per capita expenditure on government services
shows a direct relationship between population and per capita expenditure. Dao (1995) demon-
strated that the effect of population on government expenditure is non-linear since he found an
ambiguous relationship between disaggregate government expenditures and population. Sanz
and Velzquez (2002) presented a significant negative relationship on sector-specific government
expenditure and population, especially in the case of pure public goods.
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3.7 Demographic Pattern
Since government spending, especially health care and social security, tends to be related to
the demographic structure of any economy, we need to take into account the variations of the
dependency ratio of the population (Sanz and Velzquez 2002; Remmer 2004). The dependency
ratio is measured as the percentage of the population that is 65 years of age or older. Simi-
larly, a high degree of urbanization leads to a greater demand for services like education, roads
and transportation and, greater urbanization will promote more government expenditure on
infrastructure and public utilities.
4 Data and Hypothesis
4.1 Hypothesis
Numerous hypotheses have been proposed in various literature on the determinants of gov-
ernment expenditure. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive theory, and different studies
are quite independent and fragmented. The approach taken by this study is to test a number
of different hypotheses which have been used or proposed in various literature. At times, an
hypothesis may be conflicting in nature but at least this will shed light on the determinants of
the government expenditure pattern of developing countries.
The method that cross-country panel studies typically use is to convert the data from level
to some reference percentage since bigger economies tend to have bigger economic variables
if captured in levels. However, rather than levels, we are particularly interested in percentage
allocation of economic variables with respect to GDP. Similarly, for the demographic variables
we converted all the variables as a percentage of total population. To capture the size of the
country, we used the log of population for a better fit. Fractionalization variables are expressed
in probability, whereas most of the political variables are expressed as dummy variables. The
rest of the variables are expressed as indexes.
To understand the determinants of government expenditure, we categorized four families
of variables, other than economic variables. Demand side explanation of government expendi-
ture, believing that government is the provider of necessary public goods, has been credited to
analyze the fluctuation of GFCE in developing countries. Hypotheses used in this study are the
following:
Base variables: Aid per capita, Total debt (in % of GDP), Openness (in % of GDP), GDP per
capita and Log of population.
Demographical variables: Elderly population, ages 65 and above (% of total population),
Young population, ages 15 and below (% of total population), Urban population (% of total) and
Population growth rate (annual).
Fractionalization variables: Ethnic fractionalization, Linguistic fractionalization and Reli-
gious fractionalization.
Political institutional variables: Years of office (number of years the chief executive of the
nation has been in office), Number of government seats, Number of opposition seats, Military
officer (1 if the chief executive is a military officer), Legislative election (1 if yes), Executive elec-
tion (1 if yes), Nationalist party (1 if yes) Regional party (1 if yes) and polity index (a standard
measure of governance on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (dictatorial) to +10 (consolidated
democracy)).
Governance variables: Voice and accountability (varies from -2.5 to +2.5), Political stability
and absence of violence (varies from -2.5 to +2.5), Control of corruption (varies from -2.5 to
+2.5), Government effectiveness (varies from -2.5 to +2.5), Regulatory quality (varies from -2.5
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to +2.5) Rule of law (varies from -2.5 to +2.5) and Corruption perception index, CPI (varies from
0 to 145).
A detailed description of these variables as well as summary statistics is available in table
15 and table 13 in appendix.
4.2 Data Issues
All the base variables and demographical variables have been taken from the World Bank De-
velopment Indicators CD-ROM 2008 (WDI 2008) published by the World Bank. The fraction-
alization data has been taken from Alesina et al. (2003). In this study, new measures of ethnic,
linguistic and religious fractionalization for some 190 countries have been constructed. How-
ever, due to the high degree of multicolinierity in our models, we could not use more than
one fractionalization variable at a time. The set of political variables has been taken from the
Database of Political Institutions (DPI2004) provided by the Development Research Group of
the World Bank. This dataset is constructed by Beck et al. (2001) and the index created in this
series has been described in their appendix. In the case of institutional variables, the data was
not available for the periods 1997, 1999 and 2001. For this set of variables, we have constructed
the values of the missing years by using the means of the corresponding forward and backward
years. Except for the CPI data, the institutional variables have been taken from the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI) project by the World Bank. This dataset is constructed by Kauf-
mann et al. (2005) which is only available for the 1996− 2005 period. The CPI index has been
taken from Transparency International’s website. The ‘Polity Score’ is a standard measure of
governance on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (dictatorial) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
5 Methodology
Various literatures of time-series-cross-section (TSCS) data analysis have used random effect
models rather than country-specific fixed effect models (For example see Shelton 2007). The
reason for such practise is due to the problem of ’unit centering’ methodology of the fixed effect
model (Beck 2008, pg. 8). Under fixed effect model, since all cross-sectional effects have been
eliminated, it is almost impossible to estimate the impact of any variables that do not change or
seldom change (for example political regimes or institutional variables).6 Also, when the error
component of TSCS data has group-wise heteroskedasticity then fixed effect models cannot be
efficiently estimated with OLS (Yaffee 2003). Hence, in empirical and applied research, well
specified models do not require to use fixed effects model. As stated in Beck (2008), ‘Ideally
one would like to explain the effects by substantive variables, and not simply conclude that
Germany grew faster because it was Germany’. The advantage to random affect models is
the ability to estimate time invariant variables as well as we can save a number of degree of
freedom, which will assist us in obtaining more efficient estimates of the regression parameters.
Initially, we tested for the poolability estimation and the result suggested that pooled OLS
would be inappropriate. We then tested with the basic specification for the Hausman specifica-
tion test (Hausman 1978) which could not reject the null hypothesis that a random effect model
is consistent; hence we could use the random effect model which is also consistent with the
work of Shelton (2007).
The problem with random effect estimation is the strong assumption about cross-sectional
independence across panels. It is rare to find such an assumption of independent error terms
6In political economy research, it is quite common to encounter a case where the dependent variable is affected by a
variable which varies across units but remains constant over time.
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across panels in cross-country studies. As stated in Beck (2001) the errors of time-series-cross-
section models may have (a) panel level heteroscedasticity which means each country could
have its own error variance i.e. E(i,t j,s) = σ2i if i = j and s = t or 0 otherwise; (b) contem-
poraneous correlation of the errors which means error for one country may be correlated with
the errors of the other countries in the same year i.e. E(i,t j,s) = σi, j if i 6= j and s = t or 0
otherwise or (c) serial correlation which means errors for a given country are correlated with
previous errors for that country i.e. i,t = ρi,t−1 + vi,t. Hence, we would expect to observe
panel heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation and serial correlation in the error term
of the time-series-cross-country regressions as error variance varies from nation to nation.
To test the hypothesis of cross-sectional independence in panel-data models with small T
and large N we used semi-parametric tests proposed by Friedman (1937) and Frees (1995, 2004)
as well as the parametric testing procedure proposed by Pesaran (2004).7 In our study we found
evidence of contemporaneous correlation across the units using the above-mentioned tests. We
also tested the group-wise heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the panel data with the
help of a modified Wald test and Wooldridge test respectively. Both the tests showed evidence
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the dataset. As mentioned by Baltagi (2005, pg. 84)
assuming homoscedasticity disturbances and ignoring serial correlation when heteroscedastic-
ity and serial correlation are present will result in consistent but inefficient estimations and
standard errors could be wrong. As a result, models needed to be corrected for such patterns of
the error terms to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the regressors.
Two standard methods used by the researchers to correct such problems in the data, are
the Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) method and the Prais-Winsten transformation
procedure. Both estimates will produce consistent estimates as long as the conditional mean is
correctly specified. In our study, we chose to use the FGLS procedure for its power to produce
estimates with time invariant variables. Under FGLS, Beck and Katz (1995) have suggested
using panel specific AR1 parameters over single AR parameters in case of time-series-cross-
sectional models. Nonetheless, the quality of the national data of the developing countries,
which we are using for the study, varies significantly among countries, which is also a potential
source of heteroscedastic error structure in the model.
It is argued that current political, social and economical institutions for many countries are
largely determined by their past history, geography, religion and climate. (Putman 1993; Ace-
moglu et al. 2001). To capture such time independent constant effect, we used continental dum-
mies. All the regression estimations have year-specific dummies which have accommodated the
year-specific variation in the model. We tested for panel unit root process in the dependent vari-
able for both common and individual unit root process, and five out of six tests rejected the null
of having a unit root process in the dependent variable. Government expenditure responses
are likely to occur with a delay, thus to capture such a phenomenon as well as to tackle the
endogenous nature of the economic variables, one year lagged variables have been used. Such
lag independent variables in the estimations will control for any two-way causality between
dependent and independent variables.
In order to test the robustness of the model, we imputed some missing variables of the
countries to improve the degrees of freedom of the model and also to check the persistence of
the estimations. There are some countries which have very good data but one or two years’ data
is missing for some variables. We have used linear trend imputation techniques to estimate the
missing values for these countries.8
7We used xtcsd routine in STATA which is developed by De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) to check such assumptions
in STATA.
8The maximum number of imputations done for any country for any variable is two years. If the data for more than
two years is missing, we have dropped the country. Imputation has been done only for the voice and accountability,
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The basic specification for the model is
GFCEi,t = α +β ∗ Base Variablesi,t +γ ∗ Yeart + δ ∗ Continent Dummyi +i,t. (1)
Where i denotes the country and t denotes the year. For an extended specification we will keep
the basic specification with an added set of new variables. 9 Finally to test the robustness of our
findings, we also use extended specification (in the appendix) as well as tested the key variables
with Extreme bound analysis suggested in Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt (1992).
6 Estimation results
6.1 Basic Specifications
Table 3 reports the basic specifications using both a balanced and unbalanced dataset and the
results are consistent in both regressions. Other than the coefficient of the total debt services, all
other variables are highly statistically significant. Such results show evidence that public debt
burden may not directly impact on government spending immediately. Another explanation
could be that instead of cutting government expenditure to finance the debt burden, developing
countries tend to generate higher revenues through taxation since raising revenues is quicker
than cutting pre-planned government expenditure. The point estimates from Table 3 suggest
that one standard deviation increase in income per capita (1543) in the last year will increase
the GFCE of the current year by almost 1.31% of GDP by using an unbalanced dataset (0.96%
of GDP in the case of the balanced dataset), suggesting the evidence is in favor of Wagner’s
Law. This result indicates that with the increase in the per capita income of the population,
developing economies tend to expand their public spending due to the emerging pressure on
the demand for publicly available goods and services.
[Table 3 about here]
The results in Table 3 indicate that a strong association exists between past years’ trade
openness and current government expenditure for the developing countries, which confirms
the results of Cameron (1978), Rodrik (1998) and Shelton (2007). The association between expo-
sure to external risk through trade openness increases government expenditure since govern-
ments need to provide more resources for the people to mitigate the external shocks which may
occur in the world economy. This extra expenditure could be used for social security and wel-
fare spending purposes, or could be directed towards creating more jobs through larger public
work programs. Moreover, greater trade openness leads to greater demand for transport fa-
cilities, institutes, administrative supports and infrastructures which could also lead to bigger
expenditure for governments.
Table 3 also reveals a strong positive affiliation between past years’ per capita aid with cur-
rent government expenditure. The point estimates suggest that one standard deviation increase
in per capita aid during the previous year could lead to an increase in GFCE of 0.19% of GDP
(using the unbalanced dataset). As mentioned in Clements et al. (2004), an increase in finan-
cial aid could provide several choices for a government such as reducing revenues, increasing
political stability and control of corruption variables.
9The additional variables in equation 1 is added once at a time because of the high and statistically significant level
of multicollinearity among the categorical variables that the study is interested in testing (reported in the Table 1 and 2
in the appendix). Ignoring such persistence level of multicollinearity and using all the additional categorical variable
together in a regression will fail to estimate precisely the effect of any particular categorical variable (Wooldridge 2009).
The only case we were able to use all the categorical variables is for the case of Political institutional variables which is
reported in Table 8 and 9.
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expenditure, reducing domestic borrowing or a combination of all three options. The result
in the regression supports the hypothesis that aid actually increases government expenditure
significantly for developing countries. This finding is not surprising, since financial assistance
provided by donors and international agencies is mostly in the form of non-fungible project
assistance which requires matched spending from the recipient government.
We further find that a one standard deviation increase in the log of population leads to a de-
crease in GFCE by 2.3 % of GDP. This result shows evidence of large preference heterogeneity-
led reduction in government expenditure as hypothesized by Alesina and Wacziarg (1998).
Among the continental dummies, we can observe that on average, GFCE as a % of GDP is
higher in European countries than other continents, which is quite consistent with other ex-
tended specifications. On the other hand, South American countries have a relatively smaller
share of GFCE as a % of GDP than other continents. This particular result confirms that Euro-
pean countries tend to accommodate a greater degree of publicly-provided goods and services
such as social security and health care than other continents, which has increased the relative
size of their government expenditures.
6.2 Demographic Variables
Tables 4 and 5 present the extended specifications of base variables with a set of demographic
variables which reveal the association of government expenditure with demographic variables.
Comparing the base variables of Table 1 with those of tables 2 and 3 demonstrates the consis-
tency across the estimations. Model 1 in tables 2 and 3 presents that, with a increasing fraction
of the population over 65, developing countries tend to have smaller government expenditure
as a % of GDP. The reason for this finding is two-fold. Firstly, analyzing from the demand side,
developing countries tend to have a demographic pattern which is higher in young population
than richer countries, hence their expenditure on senior citizens is relatively smaller. Moreover,
in most developing countries, it is very difficult to find an adequate and established pension
and social security system for the aging population. Due to the lack of resources, these gov-
ernments mostly prioritize their expenditure towards revenue generating sectors rather than
spending on an older population. Hence, in developing countries, elders are mostly looked af-
ter by their immediate family members. Secondly, analyzing from the supply side, a population
aged over 65 contributes less to the economy, which eventually reduces the revenue collected
through taxation. As a result, with the growing fraction of the population aged over 65, gov-
ernments will have less revenue and will have less allocation for government expenditure as a
share of GDP.
[Table 4 and 5 about here]
By contrast, a strong and positive association has been found between a population aged less
than 15 and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, and this finding is consistent even
in the balanced panel. This result reveals that developing countries on average allocate more
expenditure to the growing fraction of younger population. A one standard deviation increase
in the fraction of population less than 15 is associated with an increase of GFCE by 0.66% of
GDP. Such a rise in expenditure is mostly directed towards the education and health sectors of
the economy to fulfil the emerging demand for these services with the greater fraction of young
population. Similarly, strong positive association between the degree of urbanization and pub-
lic expenditure has also been found in both the balanced and unbalanced dataset, showing the
emerging demand for public utilities and services in urban areas as the fraction of population
living in urban areas increases. Internal rural to urban migration is a common phenomenon in
developing countries, since the expected income in urban areas is higher than in the rural areas.
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As the degree of urbanization increases, governments need to spend more on transportation,
public utilities and amenities to fulfil the rising demand for such services.
No significant correlation between government expenditure and population growth could
be found in the regression, which is quite a puzzling result. One of the recent policy develop-
ments in developing countries has been a population reduction program to restrict population
growth. As a result, very small variations for the population growth variables exist in the panel
dataset which could lead to an insignificant relationship between population growth and public
expenditure.
6.3 Fractionalization variables
Three different measures of fractionalization: ethnic, language and religion, have been used
with the base variables to test the association of fractionalization with government expendi-
ture. The results of such regressions are reported in tables 6 and 7 by using both the balanced
and unbalanced dataset. Both the tables 6 and 7 show that base variables demonstrate consis-
tency with appropriate signs and significance level. The coefficient of ethnic fractionalization
shows no significant power in explaining the variation in government expenditure in the case
of the unbalanced dataset, whereas the variable is highly statistically significant in the case of
the balanced dataset. One possible explanation for such difference in estimation could be the
loss of degrees of freedom in the balanced dataset. The data reveals that on average, ethnic
fractionalization, is remarkably higher in the African nations than in other continents. To be
specific, the average probability that two randomly selected people do not belong to the same
ethnic group in African countries is 0.25 whereas the average is only 0.06 in European nations.
In our data, eighteen out of twenty most ethnically heterogenous countries belong to Africa,
demonstrating the degree of ethnic diversity in Africa. Therefore, instead of using ethnicity
to explore the cross-country difference in government expenditure, it would be more sensible
and interesting to explore the association between ethnic diversity and GFCE in African na-
tions. Model 2 in table 6 and 7 reveals that ethnic fractionalization is significantly negatively
correlated with government expenditure and has an economically large coefficient in both the
balanced and unbalanced dataset. Ethnic diversity influences the economic performance of any
nation and has a direct influence over growth performance (Easterly and Levine (1997)). The
estimation confirms that with a greater degree of ethnic heterogeneity, nations in Africa tend to
reduce the size of government expenditure. A high degree of ethnic fractionalization leads to
under-provision of publicly available services like education, transportation and infrastructure,
which has a negative impact on the economic growth of the continent and could be used to
explain the recent growth tragedy of Africa.
[Table 6 and 7 about here]
Linguistic fractionalization, on the other hand, is more or less a common phenomenon in any
continent and has significant explanatory power to address the variation of government expen-
diture in cross-country regression. Linguistic fractionalization could be quite high in countries
where ethnic fractionalization is not extreme. For example, India has an ethnic fractionalization
of 0.41, although linguistic fractionalization is almost 0.81 and can be seen as an extreme case.
Furthermore, linguistic heterogeneity is intense even in Latin American countries as well as in
Asia and Africa. Regression on unbalanced data reports that a one standard deviation increase
in linguistic fractionalization is associated with a decrease of GFCE by 1.07% of GDP. However,
religious fractionalization does not seem to be correlated with government expenditure. The
difference in the result between religious and other heterogeneity is quite notable since reli-
gious fractionalization is mostly endogenous in nature (Alesina et al. 2003). Individuals and
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families can convert to another religion quite easily, and a high degree of religious heterogene-
ity could be a sign of tolerance and harmony rather than conflict, which could also explain the
reason for not getting any statistical significance of religious fractionalization and government
expenditure. Our results broadly remain the same even when we use the extended specification
to understand the role of fractionalization in explaining government expenditure (see table 14
in appendix at the end of this chapter).
6.4 Political institutional variables
Political institutions play a pivotal role in deciding the shape and size of the government, and
it is necessary to understand the determinants of government expenditure through the lens
of political institutions. However, inadequate data on the political institutions of countries,
especially for developing countries, has made the cross-country empirical work handicapped.
We used a recent dataset, the Database of Political Institutes (DPI), which has been developed
by the Development Research Group at the World Bank. DPI contains numbers of variables for
the period we are interested in and has many dimensions to enable better understanding of the
political economy on government expenditure.
One of the most discussed issues in political economy is the role of an incumbent govern-
ment in artificially boosting the economy before election, pioneered by the scholarly contri-
butions of Nordhaus (1975) and Tufte (1980). The desire to be re-elected leads incumbents to
increase expenditure by district-specific spending and social welfare spending to stimulate the
economy. Schuknecht (2000), Persson and Tabellini (2002) and Pesaran (2004) in their influen-
tial work demonstrated how political institutions systematically shape the policy incentives for
governments during elections. Such manipulation of budgetary policy for electoral gain varies
across different electoral systems and veto structures (Chang 2008; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002).
In order to capture the impact of an election on government expenditure, two dummy variables
of executive and legislative election have been used. Tables 8 and 9 report that legislative elec-
tion has significant positive association with government expenditure and shows evidence of
an incumbent government’s desire to amplify the economy during an election. This tendency
of governments is found to be true in the case of executive election by using a balanced dataset.
However, the relationship between executive election and GFCE, though positive, becomes sta-
tistically less powerful when using an unbalanced dataset.
[Table 8 and 9 about here]
Different political regimes may also play a determinative role in explaining the cross-country
variation in government expenditure. The literature mainly focuses on the public good provi-
sion of different forms of government and different forms of democracy (Persson and Tabellini
1999; Pesaran 2004; Milesi-Ferretti et al. 2002; Besley and Case 2003; Baqir 2002). It is found in
the literature that dictatorships provide fewer public goods than democracies since dictators
have different objectives when providing public goods than democracies. McGuire and Olson
(1996) theoretically proved that democratic governments do more redistribution than autocratic
governments since the latter maximize the welfare of an elite subset rather than the whole pop-
ulation. Niskanen (1997) showed that democratic governments produce substantially higher
outcomes, income and transfer payments by maximizing the welfare of the median income
voter. Lake and Baum (2001) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrated empirical ev-
idence in support of lower public good provision (in the case of public health and education)
under a dictatorship. To capture the impact of different political regimes, the Polity Index has
been converted to regime categories as suggested in Marshall and Jaggers (2003). The categories
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used are basically dummy variable where the categorization of ‘autocracies’ (-10 to -6), ‘anoc-
racies’ (-5 to +5), and ‘democracies’ (+6 to +10) have been used. Our regression reveals strong
association of autocracy and democracy with the variation of government expenditures when
compared with anocracies. When a government moves from anocracy to democracy, or from
anocracy to autocracy, the shift in political regime significantly increases the size of the govern-
ment. However, the choice of public good provision under different political regimes could be
completely different. Democratic governments mostly spend excess funds on providing better
health care, education, environmental protection and transfer payments (Deacon 2009). By con-
trast, autocratic government might focus expenditure on the expansion of law enforcement or
providing better facilities to the elite to keep them satisfied. In a democratic regime, govern-
ments usually have a short-term fiscal horizon in contrast to autocratic governments, for which
the policy horizon is mostly long-term. As a result, autocratic governments can be aggressive
in terms of expenditure and can continue to make expensive bad policy choices.
One extreme form of dictatorship is military dictatorship, in which the dictator comes from
a military background. Our regressions suggest that public consumption expenditure shrinks
significantly under military dictatorship. This finding is not surprising since a military dic-
tatorship historically has high entry and exit costs; entry may require the overthrowing of a
powerful ruler, or mass killing through a military coup, or even civil war, whereas exit might
involve the imprisonment or death of the military dictator. Hence, military dictators channelize
a large share of government expenditure towards military investment, keeping in mind of their
own protection, will have obvious negative impact on the current consumption of government
expenditure. Moreover, military dictators would be unable to implement any effective fiscal
policy because of the uncertain span of the government. This uncertainty might then influ-
ence military dictators to cut down on government expenditure and as well as make them very
reluctant to undertake ambitious projects which require further expenditure. In most cases,
countries under the rule of a military dictatorship do not receive any foreign aid from interna-
tional donors, and international trade with such countries becomes restricted, which may also
reduce government expenditure in these countries.
Other than political regime variables, ‘Years of office’ and ‘Number of government’ variables
are found to be highly significant and positive in influencing government expenditure. ‘Years of
office’ explains how a government increases its confidence in large investments and long-term
fiscal decisions, if the same government remains in power and runs a country for a long time,
whereas the ‘Number of government’ variable shows how influential a government can be if
one political party has an absolute majority in the parliament.
6.5 Governance variables
There is a growing consensus among scholars, policymakers and donors that good governance
is one of the keys to achieve sustainable economic development. There is evidence in the lit-
erature that good governance contributes significantly to economic development (North 1981;
Shleifer and Vishny 1993) as well as to economic growth (Mauro 1995; Easterly and Levine 1997);
hence this appears to be a well-established economic proposition. However empirical measures
of governance are very difficult because such measures have to be comparable across countries
and free from measurement errors. Only a handful of governance measurement indices are
available in the literature and we selected the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset
of the World bank for its wide coverage and comparability features across countries.10 Such
indices are subjective and highly unlikely to create endogeneity-bias as it is highly unlikely that
10Details of WGI indicators as well as the disaggregated underlying indicators are available at Kaufmann et al. (2009)
and www.govindicators.org
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the indices of governance quality can be influenced by the variation of government expendi-
ture. In addition, the direction of causality could be an issue, as one might wonder whether the
variation of government expenditure drives the quality of governance, or the existing quality
of governance affects the public expenditure. The direction of causality is perhaps more plausi-
ble from governance to government expenditure, that is, it seems reasonable to argue that the
existing level of governance influences government expenditure rather than the current level of
government expenditure being responsible for the quality of governance (Mauro 1995).
[Table 10 and 11 about here]
WGI have six different variables to capture the quality of the governance in any nation. Ta-
ble 10 reveals that other than voice and accountability and regulatory quality variables, all WGI
variables have highly significant and positive association with government expenditure. The
first significant variable among the WGI is the political stability variable, where the data cap-
tures ‘the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown
by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism’
(Kaufmann et al. 2009, pg. 6). More politically stable governments can implement long-term
fiscal policies and can provide better publicly-available goods and services which perhaps ex-
plains the positive impact of political stability on public expenditure. On the other hand, the
‘Government effectiveness’ variable captures the perception of the quality and degree of in-
dependence of the public and civil services. It also captures the quality of policy formulation
and implementation, and the credibility of a government’s commitment. As a result, a superior
government effectiveness index means the civil and public services exercise a higher degree of
independence and quality, and the government is also credible and effective in terms of policy
implementation. Achieving such effectiveness demands a more decentralized public authority
system, which in turn requires higher government expenditure; hence, such a demand might
have driven the association of government expenditure with government effectiveness. Simi-
larly, the variable ‘Rule of law’ measures the quality of contract enforcements, the police, and
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. As mentioned in Kaufmann (2005,
pg. 83), ‘For improvements in rule of law, a one standard deviation difference would constitute
the improvement from the level of Somalia to those of Laos, from Laos to Lebanon, Lebanon to
Italy, or Italy to Canada’. Hence, improving the ‘Rule of law’ requires governments to increase
their current expenditure on law enforcement (by, for example, hiring more police) as well as
on judiciary spending.
Corruption is another very important indicator of the quality of governance and it is a per-
sistent feature of countries over time and space (Aidt 2003). Corruption is both pervasive, con-
sistent and significant around the world, even in developed countries. Though some stud-
ies have concluded that some level of corruption might be desirable (Leff 1964), most studies
suggest that corruption is quite harmful for the development process of any economy (Gould
and Amaro-Reyes 1983; Klitgaard 1991), and is a particularly crucial issue for poor countries.
Countries in Africa and Latin America which are infamous for corruption are also severely
poverty stricken, in contrast with developed countries which have lower levels of corruption.
Pioneering a systemic empirical analysis on corruption and composition of government ex-
penditure, Mauro (1998) found that corrupt countries have more frequently been associated
with low spending on public education and health, possibly because such spending does not
provide many rent-seeking opportunities for government officials compared to other compo-
nents of spending. Corruption within countries has also been linked to poor quality roads and
inadequate electric distribution (Tanzi and Davoodi 1997) and poor environmental protection
outcomes (Welsch 2004). Countries with a high level of corruption will spend a bigger fraction
of their limited resources on infrastructure projects, military equipment and high-technology
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goods produced by a limited number of oligopolistic firms (Hines 1995). Such governments
spend high in these avenues which are more susceptible to corruption, rather than spending
on education, health, welfare and transfer payments, and repair and maintenance, where the
scope for corruption is very limited. As explained in Mauro (1998), public officials may have
‘little room for maneuver’ for corruption in relation to old-age pensions or salaries for nurses
or teachers. Therefore on a priori grounds, it would be reasonable to argue that a high level
of corruption reduces government consumption expenditure since such expenditure is focused
on services and consumption rather than on investments. Corruption may also have a supply
side effect on government expenditure. Highly corrupt countries may collect lesser tax rev-
enues; voters may well think very negatively about paying tax if they believe that their money
will eventually go to the pockets of corrupt bureaucrats. Reduced tax revenue clearly gives
governments less to spend on current consumption and expenditure.
We used two variables to understand the impact of corruption on GFCE. The first is the Cor-
ruption Perception Index (CPI) which measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption
based on 13 different expert and business surveys.11 In our CPI variable, instead of corruption
scores, we used the rank of countries to provide better variation in the variable. The higher
the rank of a country in the CPI, the higher the perception of corruption for that country. Our
regression confirms the prior assumption that corruption has considerable negative bearing on
government consumption expenditure and the result is significant even with 1% level of signif-
icance (Model 7). To test the robustness of our findings, we used a second corruption variable
known as ‘Control of corruption’ from the WGI dataset where the variable measures the exercise
of public power for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and state corrup-
tion measured on a scale between +2.5 to -2.5. The lower the score for ‘control of corruption’ in
a country, the higher the corruption for that country. Similar to our previous findings, we find
that the more corrupt countries spend less on current government consumption expenditure
and this result is highly statistically significant. The result stays the same even when using the
balanced panel data for the regression (see table 11). The reason for such finding could be that
corrupt governments reduce the spending on current consumption and increase the spending
on public investment and transfers where they have better scope for corruption. Our coefficient
of ‘control of corruption’ is positive and significant, suggesting less corrupted countries spend
more on salaries, wages, social securities and safety net programs thus require larger GFCE.
7 Robustness Check
7.1 Extreme bound analysis
The purpose of this section is to examine the robustness of the regression results presented
above with the aid of Leamer’s (1983) Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA), which is a common
approach used in cross country empirical work. EBA is useful in investigating the sensitivity of
the empirical findings to the changes in the number of explanatory variables. The specification
used in the paper is similar with the technique discussed in Levine and Renelt (1992). Our
Specifications is:
GFCEi,t = α +βMM +βII +βZZ +. (2)
Where M is the variable of interest, I is the base variables which are always included in the
regression, and Z is a subset of variables chosen from a set of potentially important explanatory
variables. EBA varies the subset of Z variables included in the regression to find the widest
11Details of CPI is available at www.transparency.org
20
range of co-efficient estimates (Levine and Renelt 1992). In such test, we need to find the lower
extreme bound and the upper extreme bound for the all possible regressions with the same
number of parameters. The extreme bound test suggests that the variable M is not robust if it
changes the sign between lower and upper extreme values. This entails that as long as there
exists one regression for which the sign of the coefficient is not significant or the coefficient
changes the sign, the variable is not robustly influential.
[Table 12 about here]
In Table 12 results of the robustness of the key variables are reported. In our investigation
with EBA, only two variables, Language fractionalization and political stability, could not pass
the test. On the basis of this results, one can assert a reasonable amount of confidence in the
partial correlations of all the important variables of this study.
7.2 Extended specification
To further check for the robustness of our study, we also estimated regressions in the extended
specification as demonstrated in table 14. Our main findings of this study remain consistent
and do not change sign even in these sets of specifications. However, some of the key vari-
ables become statistically less powerful due to the loss of degrees of freedom in the different
specification.
8 Conclusion
This study has identified the factors that have influenced recent patterns of government ex-
penditure in developing countries. We used data from the World Development Indicators
2008, Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Database of Political Institutions (DPI2004) and
Transparency International for 111 developing countries from 1984-2004. However, the research
has been affected by the unavailability of data of some important economic variables over the
period we examined. Some developing countries are still unable to provide important economic
data as they have poor institutional facilities for providing up-to-date indexes.
Using both the balanced and unbalanced panel dataset for developing countries, we found
evidence that political and institutional variables significantly influence government expendi-
ture, which contradicts Strum’s (2001) conclusion. Among other results, we found new evidence
of Wagner’s law which is true in the case of lagged estimation. Corruption has been found to be
negatively influencing the government consumption expenditure in the developing countries.
Corrupt bureaucrats may have little rent-seeking opportunities from the consumption expen-
diture compared to other components of spending. As a result, corrupt officials would like to
reduce the consumption portion of the government expenditure to channel some additional re-
sources towards other forms of government spending which is more susceptible to corruption.
Demographic patterns of the population is found to have considerable impact on govern-
ment consumption expenditure; having a positive association with younger population and a
negative association with older population. We also find evidence that greater fractionalization
leads to lower government expenditure as linguistic and ethnic fractionalization has sizable
negative influence over government expenditure. Furthermore, our results suggest that auto-
cratic governments with military rule are not particularly accommodative towards government
consumption expenditures since their interests do not lie in the improvement of the welfare of
the people. In contrast, such from of governance is more interested in the benefit and protec-
tion of their own as well as the welfare of the elite who will ensure their power in the politics.
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Hence, In developing countries, this form of governance is likely to hold little appeal for those
who directly depend on publicly provided utilities and spending.
Some policy implications we would suggest in view of this study are the improvement
and restructure of the composition of government expenditure by increasing the share of those
spending categories that are less sensitive to corruption (such as education). Since greater frac-
tionalization decreases government consumption expenditure by a significant margin, adequate
care should be taken by governments to reduce the conflicts associated with fractionalization
within the public sphere of the economy.
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FIGURE 5: Continent wise government consumption expenditure as % of GDP for developing countries (unbalanced panel.)
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FIGURE 6: Year wise average of government consumption expenditure as % of GDP for developing countries (unbalanced panel.)
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FIGURE 7: Quartile distribution of government consumption expenditure as % of GDP for developing and OECD Countries (unbalanced panel.)
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TABLE 1: Pairwise correlation among demographical and fractionalization variables, unbalanced panel
(1984-2004).
pop65+ pop0-14 urbanpop popgrowth ethnic language religion
pop65+ 1
pop0-14 -0.899*** 1
urbanpop 0.520*** -0.607*** 1
popgrowth -0.713*** 0.737*** -0.385*** 1
ethnic -0.361*** 0.418*** -0.285*** 0.345*** 1
language -0.320*** 0.388*** -0.451*** 0.299*** 0.718*** 1
religion 0.0883*** -0.0109 -0.162*** -0.110*** 0.311*** 0.368*** 1
* p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, *** p¡0.001
TABLE 2: Pairwise correlation among WGI and CPI variables, unbalanced panel (1984-2004).
v n a polstab goveffect regqual law concorp CPI rank
v n a 1
polstab 0.575*** 1
goveffect 0.573*** 0.630*** 1
regqual 0.681*** 0.549*** 0.782*** 1
law 0.627*** 0.689*** 0.862*** 0.744*** 1
concorp 0.558*** 0.641*** 0.837*** 0.683*** 0.874*** 1
CPI rank -0.479*** -0.551*** -0.716*** -0.648*** -0.731*** -0.777*** 1
* p¡0.05, ** p¡0.01, *** p¡0.001
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TABLE 3: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications (1984-2004).
Independent variable: Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.005*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.003 0.005
(0.013) (0.014)
Openness(t−1) 0.009*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -1.385*** -1.332***
(0.134) (0.158)
Africa 3.656*** 3.007***
(0.456) (0.526)
Asia 3.628*** 2.306***
(0.541) (0.752)
Europe 6.893*** 1.752
(0.515) (2.048)
Constant 30.649*** 30.471***
(2.264) (2.640)
No. of. observations 1948 1440
No. of. countries 111 72
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code:
***1%, ** 5%, * 10%
Source: World Development Indicator 2008.
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TABLE 4: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with demographic
variables, unbalanced panel (1984-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.005*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Openness(t−1) 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -1.344*** -1.348*** -1.439*** -1.415*** -1.378*** -1.404***
(0.135) (0.137) (0.138) (0.134) (0.140) (0.141)
Africa 3.333*** 3.198*** 4.023*** 3.705*** 3.687*** 3.623***
(0.453) (0.500) (0.455) (0.458) (0.465) (0.506)
Asia 3.439*** 3.500*** 3.925*** 3.549*** 3.756*** 3.926***
(0.526) (0.518) (0.535) (0.544) (0.521) (0.517)
Europe 9.111*** 8.154*** 6.738*** 6.946*** 9.250*** 8.153***
(0.656) (0.710) (0.518) (0.526) (0.674) (0.717)
Population aged 65+ -0.345*** -0.387***
(0.070) (0.080)
Population ages 0-14 0.087** 0.101***
(0.035) (0.034)
Urban population 0.028** 0.024** 0.030***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Population growth 0.005 -0.007 -0.010
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Constant 31.494*** 26.838*** 30.262*** 31.140*** 31.129*** 25.825***
(2.371) (2.819) (2.271) (2.274) (2.395) (2.860)
Observations 1948 1948 1948 1948 1948 1948
No. of. countries 111 111 111 111 111 111
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, ** 5%, *
10%.
Source: World Development Indicator 2008.
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TABLE 5: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with demographic
variables, balanced panel (1984-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Openness(t−1) 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.010** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -1.389*** -1.303*** -1.456*** -1.341*** -1.480*** -1.428***
(0.163) (0.159) (0.167) (0.158) (0.172) (0.168)
Africa 2.743*** 2.502*** 3.552*** 3.068*** 3.241*** 3.393***
(0.511) (0.549) (0.550) (0.522) (0.538) (0.577)
Asia 2.171*** 2.368*** 2.903*** 2.336*** 2.630*** 3.538***
(0.734) (0.701) (0.769) (0.758) (0.768) (0.749)
Europe 1.660 1.797 1.969 1.669 1.774 2.021
(2.033) (2.058) (2.047) (2.070) (2.061) (2.060)
Population aged 65+ -0.345*** -0.447***
(0.091) (0.107)
Population ages 0-14 0.088** 0.104***
(0.042) (0.040)
Urban population 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.040***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Population growth -0.055 -0.074 -0.070
(0.073) (0.074) (0.076)
Constant 32.746*** 26.693*** 30.756*** 30.684*** 33.169*** 26.060***
(2.838) (3.260) (2.676) (2.637) (2.910) (3.346)
No. of observations 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440
No. of. countries 72 72 72 72 72 72
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code: ***1%, ** 5%, *
10%.
Source: World Development Indicator 2008.
33
TABLE 6: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with fractionaliza-
tion variables, unbalanced panel (1984-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Openness(t−1) 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -1.248*** -1.184*** -1.289*** -1.246***
(0.145) (0.144) (0.137) (0.146)
Africa 4.006*** 4.272*** 3.763*** 5.726***
(0.464) (0.471) (0.463) (0.686)
Asia 3.498*** 4.081*** 3.495*** 3.148***
(0.542) (0.574) (0.572) (0.572)
Europe 7.237*** 7.404*** 7.084*** 7.137***
(0.500) (0.507) (0.537) (0.530)
Ethnic 0.421
(0.69)
(Africa)x(Ethnic) -3.43***
(0.92)
Language -3.345***
(0.581)
Religion -0.224
(0.678)
Constant 27.494*** 30.737*** 28.153*** 27.356***
(2.460) (2.346) (2.510) (2.432)
No. of observations 1879 1879 1816 1893
No. of. countries 107 107 104 108
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Sig-
nificance code: ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: World Development Indicator 2008 and Alesina et al. 2003.
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TABLE 7: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with fractionaliza-
tion variables, balanced panel (1984-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.0147) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Openness(t−1) 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Log of population -0.676*** -0.714*** -0.737*** -0.83***
(0.176) (0.185) (0.174) (0.192)
Africa 2.505*** 5.409*** 3.413*** 2.427***
(0.534) (0.877) (0.551) (0.612)
Asia 0.043 -0.189 1.531** 0.093
(0.653) (0.700) (0.693) (0.714)
Europe 0.471 0.867 1.233 0.942
(2.193) (2.201) (2.215) (2.162)
Ethnic -2.977***
(0.609)
(Africa)x(Ethnic) -5.566***
(1.091)
Language -3.92***
(0.638)
Religion -0.682
(0.824)
Constant 22.265*** 21.713*** 22.833*** 23.155***
(2.979) (3.120) (2.984) (3.285)
No. of observations 1280 1280 1280 1280
No. of. countries 67 67 67 67
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Sig-
nificance code: ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: World Development Indicator 2008 and Alesina et al. 2003.
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TABLE 8: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with political variables, unbalanced panel (1984-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.0044** 0.0042** 0.0046** 0.0045** 0.0043** 0.0116*** 0.0119***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.0074 0.0071 0.0045 0.0058 0.0063 -0.0015 0.0007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Openness(t−1) 0.0097*** 0.0088*** 0.0097*** 0.0096*** 0.0093*** 0.0106*** 0.0105***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -1.2790*** -1.5254*** -1.2379*** -1.2890*** -1.2886*** -1.4213*** -1.5347***
(0.138) (0.152) (0.138) (0.144) (0.143) (0.126) (0.130)
Africa 3.8525*** 3.8907*** 3.8743*** 3.9040*** 3.9118*** 4.0377*** 3.8533***
(0.461) (0.448) (0.455) (0.458) (0.458) (0.397) (0.417)
Asia 3.6616*** 3.4706*** 3.7990*** 3.7629*** 3.8707*** 3.7024*** 3.4864***
(0.529) (0.543) (0.532) (0.556) (0.548) (0.455) (0.460)
Europe 6.8665*** 6.5105*** 6.7925*** 6.6483*** 6.7076*** 7.4246*** 7.1268***
(0.658) (0.659) (0.642) (0.648) (0.644) (0.578) (0.611)
Years in Office] 0.0113 0.0103
(0.007) (0.008)
No.of Govt. Seats 0.0019*** 0.0018**
(0.001) (0.001)
No. of Opposition Seats -0.0004 0.0009
(0.001) (0.001)
Executive election (1 if yes) 0.0764 0.0096
(0.058) (0.075)
Legislative election (1 if yes) 0.0789* 0.0853
(0.042) (0.054)
Autocracy 0.5367*** 0.5117***
(0.160) (0.172)
Democracy 0.3317** 0.3419**
(0.156) (0.166)
(Autocracy)x(Military)‡ -0.5509** -0.5102**
(0.226) (0.235)
Constant 28.6466*** 32.5235*** 28.0322*** 28.7853*** 28.8078*** 30.4117*** 32.1284***
(2.366) (2.562) (2.336) (2.436) (2.417) (2.154) (2.197)
No. of observations 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1754 1754
No. of. countries 108 108 108 108 108 100 100
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. ]indicates chief executive of the country. ‡ Indicates
the chief executive is military personnel (1 if yes). Significance code: ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Source: World Development Indicator
2008, Database of Political Institutions 2004 and Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset 2008.
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TABLE 9: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with political vari-
ables, balanced panel (1984-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.002
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Openness(t−1) 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -0.873*** -1.213*** -0.837*** -0.847*** -0.860*** -0.718***
(0.187) (0.204) (0.188) (0.191) (0.191) (0.166)
Africa 1.928*** 2.170*** 2.029*** 2.020*** 2.027*** 2.114***
(0.597) (0.597) (0.588) (0.580) (0.589) (0.578)
Asia 0.371 0.522 0.255 0.291 0.344 0.266
(0.648) (0.684) (0.669) (0.673) (0.683) (0.644)
Europe 1.185 1.264 1.057 1.096 1.090 0.863
(2.141) (2.229) (2.144) (2.164) (2.145) (2.204)
Years in office] 0.015*
(0.008)
No. of Govt. Seats 0.002**
(0.001)
No. of Opposition Seats -0.000
(0.001)
Executive election (1 if yes) 0.151**
(0.075)
Legislative election (1 if yes) 0.104**
(0.051)
Autocracy 0.788***
(0.239)
Democracy 0.361*
(0.185)
(Autocracy)x(Military)‡ -0.666**
(0.294)
Constant 23.665*** 28.973*** 23.161*** 23.342*** 23.551*** 20.872***
(3.162) (3.411) (3.162) (3.235) (3.237) (2.863)
No. of observations 1220 1220 1220 1220 1220 1140
No. of. countries 66 66 66 66 66 57
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. ]indicates chief executive of
the country. ‡ Indicates the chief executive is military personnel (1 if yes). Significance code: ***1%, ** 5%, *
10%. Source: World Development Indicator 2008, Database of Political Institutions 2004 and Polity IV: Regime
Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset 2008.
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TABLE 10: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with Worldwide
Governance Indicators, unbalanced panel (1996-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Total debt service(t−1) -0.012 -0.021 -0.038** -0.019 -0.054***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.018)
Openness(t−1) 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -0.701*** -0.915*** -0.675*** -0.958*** -0.037
(0.124) (0.129) (0.100) (0.123) (0.166)
Africa 4.271*** 3.443*** 3.361*** 3.708*** 3.650***
(0.319) (0.333) (0.343) (0.501) (0.405)
Asia 3.005*** 2.631*** 2.310*** 3.166*** 0.127
(0.450) (0.398) (0.434) (0.533) (0.545)
Europe 6.791*** 6.384*** 6.134*** 6.841*** 6.089***
(0.437) (0.392) (0.479) (0.433) (0.443)
Political stability 0.309**
(0.132)
Government effectiveness 0.628***
(0.177)
Rule of law 0.728***
(0.214)
Control of Corruption 1.094***
(0.191)
Corruption Perception Index -0.020***
(0.004)
Constant 19.490*** 23.932*** 19.710*** 24.363*** 10.588***
(2.097) (2.245) (1.798) (2.150) (2.830)
No. of observations 938 953 629 938 467
No. of. countries 107 107 107 107 74
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance code:
***1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Source: World Development Indicator 2008, Corruption Perception Index
2007 and Worldwide Governance Indicators 2007.
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TABLE 11: Determinants of government consumption expenditure: basic specifications with Worldwide
Governance Indicators, balanced panel (1996-2004).
Independent variable: Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GFCE (% of GDP)
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total debt service(t−1) -0.027* -0.024 -0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Openness(t−1) 0.009** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -0.417*** -0.321** -0.283**
(0.136) (0.136) (0.140)
Africa 3.881*** 4.205*** 4.071***
(0.351) (0.329) (0.373)
Asia 2.669*** 2.233*** 2.157***
(0.488) (0.500) (0.536)
Europe 6.750*** 6.594*** 6.608***
(0.407) (0.416) (0.458)
Political Stability 0.147
(0.147)
Government Effectiveness 0.552***
(0.159)
Control of Corruption 0.918***
(0.190)
Constant 14.606*** 13.165*** 12.741***
(2.389) (2.384) (2.405)
No. of observations 712 712 712
No. of. countries 89 89 89
Year-specific dummies Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in parentheses are the reported standard errors of the esti-
mation. Significance code: ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Source: World Development Indicator 2008 and and Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators 2007.
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TABLE 12: Results of Extreme Bound Analysis, unbalanced panel (1984-2004).
Variables Min/max Coefficient t-stat p-value Lower Upper Decision
bound bound
Population aged 65+ Min -0.4476 -3.1698 0.0016 -0.7247 -0.1705 Robust
Max -0.1922 -2.1333 0.0334 -0.3693 -0.0152
Population aged 0-14 Min 0.0850 3.1164 0.0019 0.0315 0.1384 Robust
Max 0.1649 6.1341 0.0000 0.1122 0.2176
Urban population Min 0.0196 2.0113 0.0444 0.0005 0.0387 Robust
Max 0.0726 3.7509 0.0002 0.0346 0.1107
Ethnic Min 1.1911 1.9619 0.0499 0.0003 2.3819 Robust
Max 6.0752 4.2629 0.0000 3.2744 8.8760
Language Min -2.0974 -2.8351 0.0046 -3.5484 -0.6463 Fragile
Max 2.6788 3.1521 0.0017 1.0108 4.3469
Political Stability Min -1.7730 -3.9826 0.0001 -2.6478 -0.8981 Fragile
Max 0.9256 3.1250 0.0018 0.3443 1.5069
Government Effectiveness Min 1.3825 3.0610 0.0023 0.4960 2.2690 Robust
Max 2.5460 5.8394 0.0000 1.6902 3.4017
Control of Corruption Min 1.5451 2.0110 0.0449 0.0353 3.0549 Robust
Max 3.2938 4.8945 0.0000 1.9730 4.6146
Corruption Index Min -0.0714 -5.4238 0.0000 -0.0972 -0.0455 Robust
Max -0.0358 -2.0581 0.0401 -0.0699 -0.0016
Years in office Min 0.0371 1.9900 0.0468 0.0005 0.0737 Robust
Max 0.0725 4.2271 0.0000 0.0389 0.1061
No. of Government Seats Min 0.0010 2.2056 0.0275 0.0001 0.0019 Robust
Max 0.0024 5.2647 0.0000 0.0015 0.0033
Autocracy Min 1.4222 4.4797 0.0000 0.7995 2.0448 Robust
Max 4.8516 8.7251 0.0000 3.7602 5.9430
Democracy Min -1.2443 -2.5290 0.0116 -2.2099 -0.2786 Robust
Max -0.6554 -1.9978 0.0459 -1.2989 -0.0120
Autocracy*Military Min -6.1907 -7.0287 0.0000 -7.9194 -4.4620 Robust
Max -1.6289 -2.1508 0.0318 -3.1154 -0.1425
Note: Results are based on OLS model. The decision criterion has been used following Leamer (1983) and Levine
and Renelt (1992). The ‘Lower bound’ and ‘Upper bound’ give the lowest and highest value of point estimates
minus/plus two standard deviation. Source: World Development Indicator 2008, Database of Political Institutions
2004 and Polity IV: Regime Authority Characteristics and Transitions Dataset 2008.
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TABLE 13: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
(Panel) (Between) (Within)
Government Expenditure 13.716 5.333 4.28 3.21 2.9 54.515 1617
Aid per capita 36.601 39.487 31.42 23.85 -23.743 421.675 1578
GDP per capita 1443.382 1543.131 1521.91 306.12 81.009 9497.559 1617
Log of population 16.181 1.616 1.62 0.14 11.547 20.983 1617
Total debt service 6.216 5.8 3.99 4.22 0 107.374 1576
Openness 67.957 38.706 35.71 15.33 10.831 280.361 1607
Urban population 42.963 19.735 19.48 3.82 4.95 92.75 1617
Old population 4.378 2.577 2.54 0.52 1.888 16.759 1617
Population Growth 2.053 1.262 0.95 0.84 -8.140 11.181 1617
Population ages 0-14 39.167 7.621 7.32 2.27 14.07 51.348 1617
Ethnic 0.537 0.243 0.24 0 0 0.930 1596
Language 0.463 0.315 0.32 0 0.01 0.923 1554
Religion 0.432 0.25 0.25 0 0.004 0.86 1596
Voice and Accountability -0.332 0.733 0.71 0.2 -1.96 1.32 675
Political Stability -0.509 0.832 0.79 0.28 -3.3 1.05 672
Government Effectiveness -0.347 0.609 0.58 0.18 -1.96 1.31 675
Regulatory Quality -0.172 0.676 0.63 0.25 -2.72 1.52 675
Rule Of law -0.428 0.615 0.59 0.18 -2.04 1.23 449
Control of Corruption -0.417 0.568 0.54 0.19 -2.13 1.51 666
Years in office? 7.957 8.426 5.57 0.19 1 46 1580
Military officer? 0.285 0.451 0.34 0.29 0 1 1578
No. of Govt. Seats 152.091 341.417 338.10 60.69 0 2978 1596
No. of Opposition Seats 44.461 60.185 50.56 33.13 0 354 1596
Legislative election? 0.194 0.395 0.07 0.39 0 1 1579
Executive election? 0.116 0.32 0.08 0.30 0 1 1579
Corruption Index 63.190 27.272 25.58 15.37 17 145 358
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TABLE 14: Extended specifications, Unbalanced panel.
Fractionalization Governance Combined
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Aid per capita(t−1) 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.003 0.006***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Total debt service(t−1) 0.003 0.000 -0.015 -0.018 -0.020 -0.016
(0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Openness(t−1) 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.007** 0.006 0.006* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
GDP per capita(t−1) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of Population -1.408*** -1.378*** -0.984*** -0.960*** -0.745*** -0.917***
(0.151) (0.146) (0.147) (0.150) (0.150) (0.134)
Population aged 65+ -0.191* -0.146 -0.207** -0.247** -0.043 -0.182*
(0.110) (0.112) (0.097) (0.098) (0.124) (0.097)
Population aged 0-14 0.128*** 0.137*** 0.062* 0.057 0.060 0.097***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.033) (0.038) (0.040) (0.035)
Urban population 0.036*** 0.020** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.034***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Years in office 0.010 0.008 0.004 -0.000 0.006 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
No. of Govt. Seats 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
No. of Opposition Seats 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Democracy 0.508*** 0.529*** 0.429** 0.503*** 0.340* 0.451***
(0.166) (0.171) (0.168) (0.181) (0.174) (0.167)
Autocracy 0.518*** 0.661*** 0.803*** 1.058*** 1.041*** 0.793***
(0.178) (0.187) (0.247) (0.263) (0.240) (0.243)
(Autocracy)x(Military) -0.491** -0.597** -0.971*** -1.046*** -1.396*** -0.934**
(0.238) (0.253) (0.359) (0.367) (0.340) (0.367)
Africa 5.866*** 3.556*** 3.674*** 3.775*** 4.123*** 4.048***
Continued on next page...
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... table 14 continued
Fractionalization Governance Combined
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(0.491) (0.554) (0.422) (0.423) (0.389) (0.681)
Asia 3.914*** 3.774*** 3.235*** 2.687*** 2.867*** 3.185***
(0.482) (0.560) (0.421) (0.445) (0.428) (0.397)
Europe 10.164*** 9.688*** 9.168*** 9.178*** 8.253*** 9.408***
(0.827) (0.852) (0.608) (0.609) (0.709) (0.603)
(Africa)x(Ethnic) -3.589*** -1.401*
(0.726) (0.8)
Language -2.483***
(0.612)
Control of Corruption 1.299*** 1.302***
(0.197) (0.192)
Government Effectiveness 0.991***
(0.202)
Political Stability 0.423***
(0.145)
Constant 24.182*** 25.519*** 21.602*** 21.640*** 16.350*** 19.283***
(3.609) (3.469) (3.317) (3.355) (3.645) (3.135)
No. of observations 1744 1718 877 887 884 877
No. of countries 99 98 99 99 99 99
Average no. of years 17.61 17.53 8.85 8.95 8.92 8.85
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Values in the parentheses are the reported standard errors of the estimation. Significance
code: ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%. Source: World Development Indicator 2008, Corruption Perception
Index 2007 and Worldwide Governance Indicators 2007.
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TABLE 15: Variable description.
Variable Name Details Source
Fractionalization (Ethnic, Lin-
guistics and Religious fraction-
alization)
Average value of three different indices of ethonolinguistic
fractionalization. Its value ranges from 0 to 1. The three com-
ponent indices are: (1) index of ethnic fractionalization in 1960,
which measures the probability that two randomly selected
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnic
group (the index is based on the number and size of population
groups as distinguished by their ethnic and linguistic status);
(2) probability of two randomly selected individuals speaking
different languages; (3) probability of two randomly selected
individuals belong to two different religious background.
Alesina et.
al.
Per Capita Income (current
US$)
Annual per capita income on current US currency. Per capita
income is gross domestic product divided by midyear popu-
lation. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any prod-
uct taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degrada-
tion of natural resources.
WDI 2006
Aid per capita (current US$) Aid per capita includes both official development assistance
(ODA) and official aid, and is calculated by dividing total aid
by the midyear population estimate.
WDI 2006
Total debt service (% of GNI) Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and in-
terest actually paid in foreign currency, goods, or services on
long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repay-
ments (repurchases and charges) to the IMF.
WDI 2006
Openness (% of GDP) Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
measured as a share of gross domestic product.
WDI 2006
Population ages 65 and above
(% of total)
Population ages 65 and above is the percentage of the total
population that is 65 or older.
WDI 2006
Population ages 0 to 14 (% of
total)
Population ages 0 to 14 is the percentage of the total population
that is 14 or younger.
WDI 2006
Urban Population (% of total) Population living in the urban areas as a percentage of total
population.
WDI 2006
Population Growth Annual population growth rate. WDI 2006
Political Stability and Absence
of Violence
capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government
will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or vi-
olent means, including politically-motivated violence and ter-
rorism.
WGI 2005
Control of Corruption capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as ”capture” of the state by elites
and private interests.
WGI 2005
Government Effectiveness capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s com-
mitment to such policies.
WGI 2005
Polity Index a standard measure of governance on a 21-point scale ranging
from -10 (dictatorial) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
Polity
Score 2008
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